This article examines the political and cultural contexts of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. These two League of Nations bodies were charged with fostering international understanding through the promotion of educational, scientific, and cultural exchange. Whereas previous studies have revealed the institutional and diplomatic processes that shaped these bodies, the present article considers their intellectual genealogies and trajectories. Adopting a transnational perspective, it argues that the multi-layered quest for order is central to understanding intellectual cooperation in the interwar years. This concern was reflected in the role of cultural relations within the post-war order, and in the aim of strengthening intellectuals' position in the social order (both through legal instruments and through new tools for 'intellectual labour').
description of this organization as the 'forgotten UNESCO' seems apt, with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization beginning its operations from within the former IICI premises. Launched in 2005, the 'UNESCO History Project' has acknowledged the role of its pre-1945 precursor. 8 Akira Iriye has adopted a broader chronological perspective, interpreting intellectual cooperation in the interwar years as one manifestation of 'cultural internationalism', a term that describes efforts 'to link countries and peoples through the exchange of ideas and persons, through scholarly cooperation, or through efforts at facilitating cross-national understanding'. 9 Renoliet's monograph and earlier studies by Northedge and Kolasa have shed light on the institutional histories of the IICI and the CICI and on the rapport of these bodies with the League of Nations system. Additional research has examined specific aspects of intellectual cooperation, from the policies of individual countries to activities such as the International Studies Conferences. 10 One particular aspect, however, requires further examination: the IICI and the CICI were supposed to engage with an amorphous and sometimes ill-defined constituency, namely intellectuals. These League bodies were hence more than diplomatic entities; they involved individuals who combined scholarly or artistic activity with a commitment to public intervention. 11 Instead of covering institutional developments, my article therefore focuses on the intellectual genealogies and trajectories of the IICI and the CICI. This approach resonates with efforts to capture the intellectual history of the United Nations, 12 and with research that considers the interaction between international organizations and non-state actors as a topic of 'transnational history'. 13 Significantly, transnational history, intellectual history, and the history of intellectuals all aim beyond an institutional focus; they are concerned with transmission processes, flows, and networks that are often fragile or temporary in nature. 
A contextual examination of the League's work for intellectual cooperation reveals a concern for order at every level. As Akira Iriye has shown, ideas about global order were an inherent feature of cultural internationalism. 15 The relationship between internationalism and order has also been stressed in connection with the 'historical turn' in the study of international relations. 16 Intellectual cooperation was viewed as a tool for transforming the international order, yet its wide-ranging ambitions were subject to intrinsic boundaries. After considering the global dimensions of intellectual cooperation, this article therefore investigates other levels where the quest for order became evident: within a regional context (Europe's post-war order), within one particular strand of intellectual cooperation (education), and in the attempt to define the social and international position of one particular group (intellectual workers). This multi-layered approach can help us trace an 'intellectual order' in the making -defined here as a systematic structure that encompassed international relations, the classification of ideas, and an assigned role for intellectuals. As a whole, the article tackles a key problem in the intellectual history of the IICI and the CICI: while these bodies were vessels for efforts to create order, they depended on existing hierarchies. In other words, intellectual cooperation relied on the very structures that it sought to transform.
Intellectual cooperation and a new international order
The League of Nations was part of the attempt to create a new international order after four years of conflict. This new order did not depend on political structures alone: it also required efforts in the intellectual sphere. A contributor to L'Esprit International, the publication of the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stressed the impetus that the Great War had provided for intellectual cooperation:
It is not one of the war's less important and less curious consequences that it has inspired a need for the spiritual and moral rapprochement of peoples, for the reciprocal understanding of their ideas and sentiments, for precise and disinterested knowledge about the events in which they intersect or of which they suffer the repercussions.
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Initially, this drive towards intellectual cooperation found little resonance among the League's architects, since the Covenant of the League of Nations had not included stipulations for intellectual cooperation. However, removed from diplomatic constraints, intellectuals launched manifold initiatives for transnational exchange. In 1918, the French author Romain Rolland began to promote 'L'Internationale de l'Esprit'; in the same year, his compatriot Henri Barbusse established Clarté as both a periodical and an international movement of intellectuals. 18 In Germany, the author Heinrich Mann spoke of an 'alliance of intellectuals of all nations', while the 'Council of Intellectual Workers' -founded by the pacifist and expressionist literary critic Kurt Hiller -presented its views on the future international order. In 1922, the Austrian aristocrat Karl Anton Rohan founded the Fédéra-tion Internationale des Unions Intellectuelles (or Europä ischer Kulturbund), which has been described as the 'most important intellectual network on the continent'.
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The idea that intellectual cooperation should be part of the League's remit was exemplified by a Belgian proposal for an ' 
international relations are no longer only carried on, as they used to be in the West, between nominally Christian peoples. The so-called Family of States which is supposed to be bound by the rules of International Law includes several for whose rulers and peoples the Christian tradition, of which that body of law was an outgrowth, has no meaning whatsoever -except perhaps as reminder of the deviation between Western professions and Western practice.
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The shift in the scope and nature of internationalism manifested itself in several ways. For instance, in examining the campaigns of anti-colonial nationalists from India, Egypt, China, and Korea, Erez Manela has observed the 'expansion of international society'. 27 The League 30 Nitobe, a Japanese Christian, has been described as 'Japan's foremost internationalist before the war': Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, p. 65. 
Global order as a dialogue between civilizations
Despite its potential role as a global instrument, intellectual cooperation was subject to inherent limitations, exemplified by an attachment to categories such as civilization, race, empire, and nationhood. 
intellectual cooperation also stressed the significance of a shared heritage. Although such discussions did not preclude a consideration of global cooperation, they expressed regional allegiances that were often defined in cultural terms. The focus on a common past was not an issue for European intellectuals alone. This is illustrated by the writings of the Peruvian intellectual Francisco García Caldéron, who sat on the CICI from 1936 to 1939. His early work Latin America: its rise and progress discussed the 'Latin spirit', whose defence he portrayed as a 'duty of primordial importance'. 42 García Caldéron argued that Latin Americans had to be alert to a 'Teutonic invasion' of Latin America, 'Yankee imperialism', and the 'imperialistic designs' of Japan 'in the mysterious Orient'. 43 Stressing that 'No other continent offers so many reasons for union', he proposed to organize the Latin American states into several regional confederations.
44
Underlining his concern with the notion of a shared Latin American culture, García Caldéron was involved in the CICI's publication of a Collection ibéro-américaine, which comprised translations of several 'classic' Latin American texts. Gabriela Mistral, who had worked for the IICI and been actively involved in this venture, did not think that such undertakings showed a genuine League commitment to Latin America. Apart from the publication project, she did not believe that 'these organizations have done anything for Latin America. . . . Those monies have only served European culture.'
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In pursuing a global dialogue, the IICI required partners that could be viewed as representatives of civilization. For instance, the prominent role of Latin American states in the IICI drove on an underlying continuity of cultural internationalism, namely their portrayal If we can come into real touch with the West through the disinterested medium of intellectual co-operation, we shall gain a true perspective of the human world, realize our own position in it, and have faith in the possibility of widening and deepening our connection with it. We ought to know that a perfect isolation for life and culture is not a thing of which any race can be proud . . . Greece was not shut up in the solitude of her culture, nor was India, when she was in the full radiance of her glory.
51
It is perhaps fitting that Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan's membership of the CICI (1931-38) covered the period in which Civilisations was published. A contemporary observer described him as a 'liaison officer between two civilizations'; this became obvious with his Hibbert Lectures at University College London, which 'constituted an event even in the crowded life of London'.
A book that collected Radhakrishnan's lectures as Professor of Eastern
Religion and Ethics at the University of Oxford was entitled Eastern religions and Western thought. The themes of this collection ranged from 'the Greek spirit', through 'mysticism and ethics in Hindu thought', to 'the meeting of religions'. 53 The way in which Radhakrishnan framed his discussion mirrored the discourse adopted by other cultural internationalists: 
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The obstacles to the organization of human society in an international commonwealth are in the minds of men who have not developed the sense of duty they owe to each other. . . . The supreme task of our generation is to give a soul to the growing world consciousness to develop ideals and institutions necessary for the creative expression of the world soul, to transmit these loyalties and impulses to future generations and train them into world citizens.
54
With civilization viewed as a building block of global order, it is evident why the term 'cosmopolitanism' -often understood as an embrace of diversity and difference -does not capture the nature of cultural internationalism in the interwar years. 55 69 Such examples indicate one of the problems of intellectual cooperation: it sought to address issues of global order in its references to 'civilizations' but -at least in semi-official settings -rarely tackled the more delicate issues of race and empire. Significantly, as Bruce Mazlish has emphasized, race and empire could themselves inform and shape understandings of 'civilization'. 
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Intellectual cooperation and post-war order
If the global scope of intellectual cooperation was curtailed by its underlying civilizational categories, what about constructing order on a more limited scale? Could intellectual cooperation help to overcome the wartime divisions in Europe? From one angle, this seemed possible: after all, science appeared to have intrinsic transnational features, with cooperation constituting an underlying feature of scholarly endeavour. 71 Expressing this view, Jules Payot, educator and rector of the University of Aix-Marseille, claimed that 'any object of study, even the most humble one . . . includes the universal law that alone has made society and progress possible: the law of reciprocal help, of occupation, of work in solidarity'. 72 However, even before 1914, in 'the golden age of [scientific] internationalism', 73 science and the arts were subject to constant tensions between national and transnational forces. 74 The power of national allegiances became evident in 1914, as many intellectuals supported their governments' war policies. 75 Illustrating the deep animosities caused by the Great War, Jules Payot claimed that the German people 'in their entirety' had been 'poisoned by an education of superciliousness', whereas French writers had not been blinded by nationalism. 76 This portrayal contrasted with the analysis of the German scholar Ernst R. Curtius, who suggested that German intellectuals had re-oriented themselves towards Europe after the war, whereas their French counterparts had stuck to notions of cultural superiority. 77 Germany's role in the international order soon emerged as a key challenge for intellectual cooperation. Some cultural internationalists viewed such cooperation as a disinterested medium that could facilitate German involvement in League activities. In 1926, Alfred Zimmern portrayed this policy as successful, claiming that the 'academic Locarno' had become an 'accomplished fact before the political Locarno'. 78 Yet Zimmern's comments ignored Germany's exclusion from the International Research Council and the International Union of the Academies, and a 'counter-boycott' by German
institutions. 79 Contrary to Zimmern's optimistic assessment, Elisabeth Crawford has stressed that a 'relative normalisation' of scientific relations only became possible after Locarno. 80 Albert Einstein's membership of the CICI illustrates these ambiguities:
although he had joined the committee four years before Germany's accession to the League, his involvement was marked by disagreements regarding the policy towards Germany and by criticism from German scholars who did not regard the pacifist physicist as a sufficiently 'national' figure.
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The ambivalent stance vis-à -vis Germany became evident at many stages in the League's work for intellectual cooperation. In February 1924, for instance, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson -pacifist, historian, and Fellow of King's College, Cambridge -attacked a CICI funding appeal for universities in financial need, objecting to the 'scandalous omission' of Germany. 82 Gilbert Murray echoed this criticism in The Times. 83 In response, the Swiss CICI member Gonzague de Reynold drafted a memorandum that detailed his efforts 'to reestablish relations that had been severed by the war'. 84 However, as chair of the CICI, Henri
Bergson strongly opposed the publication of Reynold's response. The French philosopher claimed that the document gave the misleading impression 'that we desire and consider possible the immediate re-establishment of normal relations with German science'. 
would be a pity if your response was not published'. 88 Eric Drummond also became involved in the internal discussions; he recalled that, at the CICI's foundation, opinions had been divided over whether its activities should extend to non-League members such as Germany. 89 While criticizing Lowes Dickinson and Murray, his letter nevertheless seemed to question Bergson's attitude. Consequently, Bergson expressed his surprise at the secretary-general's reaction. 90 Despite professions regarding the transnational scope of science and the arts, intellectual cooperation was subject to power-political considerations and the limitations of the postwar order. Renoliet and Scholz have traced the changing nature of French policy in this respect, from an initial reluctance to support schemes for an 'intellectual' branch of the League of Nations to their subsequent embrace in the context of wider policy ends. 91 Furthermore, the inherent malleability of cultural internationalism meant that it was also at the disposal of states that challenged the existing order. Funding from Fascist Italy, for instance, helped establish the International Institute of Educational Cinematography in Rome as part of the League of Nations system. 92 After Nazi Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations, the Deutsche Kongresszentrale coordinated the country's involvement in scientific congresses. 93 German officials considered the participation in international congresses as a way of pre-empting criticism of the Third Reich at such events. 94 They claimed that, during the war, German scholars had been victims of a French strategy to use scientific internationalism for propaganda purposes; their presence at international congresses was hence interpreted as a weapon in prospective propaganda wars. At a different level, the Europä ische Revue of Rohan's Fédération Internationale des Union Intellectuelles/Europä ischer Kulturbund turned into a 'useful means of international propaganda and international contacts for the Third Reich'. 95 Similar to Italy and Germany, Japan also bundled its efforts for intel-
of education, scientific or philosophical research may lead to great international results, but they would never be initiated or would never prosper if they were not bound up with the deepest national sensibilities'. 111 The League bodies for intellectual cooperation had to strike a balance between two rather different impulses: seemingly pragmatic work for the exchange of knowledge, as often desired by governments; and engagement with more ambitious schemes, as promoted by some intellectuals and associations. In its relations with China, the former aspect seemed dominant. China sought League assistance in addressing problems in its education system; it also hoped for League help in finding European professors for chairs in English literature, geography, and geology at Nanjing University. 112 In 1931, a Chinese request led to the formation of an Educational Mission under the auspices of the CICI. 113 It brought together experts from primary to higher education; during their stay, the members of the Mission were to examine different features of China's educational life without participating in domestic debates. The work of the Educational Mission revealed some of the preconceptions that delimited intellectual cooperation: its head, Carl Heinrich Becker, for instance, was highly critical of American educational methods, emphasizing cultural and civilizational differences between the USA and China.
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While educational missions and exchanges focused on cooperation and the transmission of ideas, there were also efforts to establish more permanent fora for educational exchange. In 1920, the Union of International Associations launched the project of an 'Université internationale' at the Palais Mondial in Brussels: through an interdisciplinary study programme, this international summer school for students was meant to lay the basis for a peaceful future. 115 Although the League initially supported this venture, Stephen Duggan, president of the Institute of International Education and professor at the College of the City of New York, remained sceptical:
There have come to my desk during the past year four different propositions for such an International University. It would have been much better for the League of Nations to have held a conference on the subject before adopting any single plan. Personally I think La Fontaine's idea is one that is far in the future.
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In one respect, Duggan's comments were certainly correct: the Brussels scheme was merely one of many proposals for an international university. Based on earlier educational efforts in Santiniketan, Tagore established Visva-Bharati in 1921. This institution was explicitly conceived as a place for intellectual encounters between the East and West. From a different angle, and with a focus on the arts, the Italian municipality of Capri offered to turn its Charterhouse into an international intellectual centre: 
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A centre for intellectual production and protection where, thanks to the most favourable ambiance . . . learned people, artists, international scholars will find a unique stay, a happy existence, a worthy framework to develop their thinking, to create their works. did not obtain financial backing, it was supported by Hermann Seelbach, a leading figure in the adult-education activities of German trade unions, and was met with interest from International Labour Organization (ILO) staff. These different examples illustrate how international education was viewed as a potential solution to a range of social, political, and intellectual problems. As early as 1923, the Spanish government raised 'international university' matters at the General Assembly of the League of Nations. Its intervention had two dimensions: on the one hand, it sought to advance the equivalence of diplomas in secondary and higher education; on the other, it addressed the creation of an international university. 120 The CICI was charged with examining these ideas. The resulting report described the issue of an international university as 'one of the most litigious and most contested questions in the field of intellectual cooperation'. 121 In this context, it referred to the earlier efforts of the Union of International Associations. 122 The CICI's enquiry met with a sceptical response. The University of Queensland in Australia noted the idea of 'the establishment at one of the four great Universities of Christendom -Paris, Salamanca, Oxford, or Bologna of a self-governing International University possessing full academic rights and privileges with power to confer degrees and give diplomas which will be recognised in all the States Members of the League of Nations'. However, it estimated that improved inter-university relations
